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CLERK SUPREME COURT 
IN THE SUPREME COURT (JTAH 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
• - -oooooOooooo - - - - - - . - - - - - _ - _ _ _ _ _ _ En The Matter oft 
:EASAR SWAIN 
Appelltnt - Pet i t ioner i PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
v . Case No, 
1ARY DELAND i (Utah Court o f A p p e a l s No. 910738-CA) 
Respondent n ' 0 ^ )> -'c 0 
-oooooOooooo 
The Appellant- Petitioner above named , CEASAR SWAIN, respectfully Petitions The 
Japtioned Court for It' WHIT \)Y 'KHTIORARI to The Utah Court of Appeals upon The 
grounds hereinafter respectfully presented. 
1, Consistent with- the Provisions of RULE 46, RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. The 
Petitioner respectfully seeks to nave The FINAL JUDGEMENT of V\c Utah Court if 
Appeals REVIEWED in light of The said Appellate Court's SUMMARY AFFIRMANCE of 
The Trial Court's " DENIAL " of The Petitioner's " PETITION FOR A WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS M *n<i inasmuch as said " AFFIRMANCE " is inconsistent wt th The 
Rulings of This Honorable Court, such Affirmance would appear to be in error, 
F I I P n 
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CONSTITUTIONS! 
1 1 1 1
 - " *" ' '' • • • 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
14th. Amendments • • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION! 
ARTICLE I. SECTION 7 10 
ARTICLE I. SECTION 13 6_. 
ARTICLE I. SECTION 24 8_ 
UTAH STATE STATUTORY PROVISIONS! 
76-6-412 U. C. A 
k, QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW I 
Aj. CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S RULING IN STATE V. MQRRBY. 23 UTAH 273, 6fc P.76k 
THAT THE QUESTION OF THE TRIAL COURT'S LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED 
FOR THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL, DOES IT NOT REASONABLY FOLLOW THEREFROM, THAT 
THE JURISDICTIONAL QUESTIONS THAT ARE HEREWITH RESPECTFULLY PRESENTED, ARE 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS HONORABLE COURT 7.SINCE THE TRIAL COURT ACTED WITHOUT 
JURISDICTION ? _7__ 
B. IN LIGHT OF THIS COURT'S REVERSAL AND REMAND FOR A NEW TRIAL ON SEPT., 12,1980 
IN STATE V. LAINE. 618 P.2d 33 ( UTAH 1980) AND THE MOST RECENT ( DEC.31*1991) 
CONCESSION BY THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICB THAT STATE V. LAIBE. Supra., 
WAS CONTROLLING, WHERE, AS IN THE INSTANT CASK, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO 
GIVE AN ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION IN STATE V. MARSHALL GLEN JONES, Case No. 
890297 ; Z_ 
Cj. INASMUCH AS THE OVERWHELMING RULINGS OF THIS COURT RELATIVE TO THE 
INDISPENSABLE REQUIREMENT THAT A VALID CONVICTION UNDER THE LAWS OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH REQUIRES ACCORDING " A PRELIMINARY DOMINATION. "OR A WAIVER 
THEREOF" AND WHEN, AS OCCURRED IN THE INSTANT CASK, BO PRELIMINARY HEARING 
WAS ACCORDED NOR WAIVED. CAN THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION NEVERTHELESS BE 
ALLOWED TO STAND? ? JJ_ 
5„ The UTAH COURT OF APPEALS was twice respectfully informed that T$is 
Honorable Court's GREAT EMPHASIS that was placed upon the case of STATE 
WESLEY ALLEN TUTTLE. 713 P.2d 703, 70*+ ( UTAH I985) was also IN HARMONY with This Court's 
tigh regard for The DUAL REPRESENTATION That is expressly accorded under the provisions of 
RTICLE I, SECTION 12. CONSTITUTION OF UTAH that is spelled out by its expression of the 
ollowing INDISPENSABLE RIGHT1 
" THE RIGHT TO APPEAR AND DEFEND IN PERSON" 
A N D ( AND) 
* M. COUNSEL " 
And cons i s tent with such UTAH CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE, This Court i n STATE V. TOMMY 
flS FAIR. 23 UTAH (2d) ^56 ( UTAH I969) respected The RIGHT OF THE DEFENDANT TO 
^RTICIPATE IN HIS APPEAL by/ " CONSOLIDATING THE HABEAS PETITION THAT WAS FILED TO 
JPPLEMENT THE OMISSIONS . OF COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL and by ordering The CONSOLIDATION OF 
IE PRO SB HABEAS PETITION ...WITH T H E P E N D I N G A P P E A L . . . This Court then 
id there duly respected The Defendant-Appellant'si 
"RIGHT TO BE HEARD IN PERSON, " 
AND ALSO. 
" THE RIGHT TO BE HEARD M BY COUNSEL H 
consistent with ARTICLE I. SECTION 12. CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. 
However, despite the fact that The Petitioner's APPEAL ~(DIRECT-APPEAL ) IS STILL 
PENDING BEFORE THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS . instead of LIKEWISE " CONSOLIDATING M The 
Habeas Petition with The FENDI1KL DIRECT APPEAL ...( AS WAS DONE , AS AFORESAID BY THIS 
COURT IN STATE v. FAIR, Supra*,. ( OVER- 23, YEARS. AGO). The Court of APPEALS. DECLINED TO 
ALLOW THE FOLLOWING ISSUES .TO BE CONSOLIDATED WITH THE DIRECT APPEAL THAT STILL HAS NOT 
BEEN DECIDED! 
( l) THE CRUCIAL QUESTION OP WHETHER THE STATE IS AT LIBERTY TO " AMEND" A " THIRD 
DEGREE FELONY THEFT H TO THE INCREASED GREATER DEGREE OF "SECOND DEGREE THEFT " 
WITHOUT ACCORDING A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION ( AS GUARANTEED AT ART«I. SBC. 13 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ) AND WITHOUT A WAIVER THEREOF " WITH THE CONSENT OF THE 
STATE, CONTRARY TO THE OVERWHELMING RULINGS OF THIS COURT RELATIVE THERETO. 
( z) WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR BY NOT GIVING THE -JURY THE 
JURY AN M ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION " ON THEFT AS REQUIRED BY THIS COURT IN STATE v. 
LAINE. 618 P.2d 33 ( UTAH 1980) AND REAFFIRMED AND CONCEDED TO BY CONTROLLING 
BY THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE IN THIS COURT'S RECENT ( DEC.,31, 1991) 
REVERSAL AND REMAND IN THE CASE OF STATE V. MARSHALL GLEN JONES. Case Mo. 890297 
( SLIP OPINION - Page 3. Paragraph twoj. 
(^WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT DIVESTED ITSELF OF JURISDICTION OF THE " SECOND DEGREE 
THEFT " WHEN IN ITS JURY INSTRUCTION # 11. THE JURY WAS INSTRUCTED THAT TO FIND 
THE DEFENDANT (SWAIN) " GUILTY OF SECOND DEGREE THEFT " IT HAD TO FIND THAT THE 
VALUE OF THE PROPERTY " STOLEN " WAS $1.000. WHILE THE UTAH LEGISLATURE REQUIRES 
that the VALUE OF THE PROPERT OR SERVIBES EXCEED ( " E X C E E D S ") &.000.. under 
The provisions of 76-6-*4-12 (l) (a)(i) U. C. A. SND by NOT INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
THAT THE VALUE OF THE PROPERTY HAD TO EXCEED $1,000. IN VALUE..- Tu^ TRIAL COURT 
INSTRUCTED THE JURY AS TO M A THIRD DEGREE THEFT" At 76-6-412 (l) (b)(l) U. C. A. 
( WHICH WAS NOT CHARGED.) ? 
Despite The Petitioner repeatedly informing The UTAH COURT OF APPEALS That This 
OURT ordered " CONSOLIDATION " of the "HABEAS PETITION " AND THE DIRECT APPEAL in STATE 
. FAIR. Supra., STILL, The Petitioner's RIGHT TO BE HEARD (RENAUD V. ABBOTT, 116 U.S.277) 
ON BIFF^ *?P^L ) as *.o the above stated THREE CRUCIAL ISSUES was nevertheless denied 
y me Ivu, U J ^ . Ox Appeals krt Shis Court's DIRECTIVE that " THE RIGHT TO APPEAL 
10ULD NOT BETAKEN LIGHTLY " ( of. STATE V. TUTTLE. Supra., ) was also then and there 
[SREGARDED by The Utah Court of Appeals. 
6. GROUNDS PURSUANT TO WHICH JURISDICTION OF THE CAPTIONED COURT IS INVPKEDt 
(At) The Judgement of The Utah Court of Appeals that is sought to be reviewed is 
dated MAY l4f 1992 
(B.) The Date of the Order - respecting re-hearing is May lk9 1992 
(C.) Jurisdiction is conferred upon The Captioned Court to GRANT CERTIORARI consistent 
with its H SOLE DISCRETION " as accorded under the provisions of 78-2~2 (5)UCA 
% VERBATIM CONTENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS THAT ARE RELIED UPONt 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
The l^tht Amendment t 
(it) All persons born or naturalized in the United States and 
subject to the Jurisdiction thereoff are citizens of The 
United States and of the State wherein they reside* No STATE 
shall make or enforce any Law which shall abridge the privilege 
of immunities of citizens of the United States ; Nor shall any 
State deprive any person of lifet liberty or property, without 
Due Process of Law; Nor deny to any person within its 
Jurisdiction the BJUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. ,f 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION* 
ARTICLE It SECTION 7l ( DUE PROCESS OF LAW )t 
M
 No person shall be deprived of Life* liberty or property 
without due process of Law. " 
ARTICLE Ig SECTION 131 ( PROSECUTION BY INFORMATION OR INDICTMENT ) 
M
 Offenses heretofore required to be prosequted by Indictment 
shall be prosequted by Information after examination and 
commitment by a Magistrate
 f unless the examination be 
waived by the accused with the consent of the State , or by 
An Indictment with or without such examination and commitment 
The formation of The Grand Jury and the powers and duties 
thereof shall be as prescribed by The Legislature. 
ARTICLE It SECTION 2*+i ( UNIFORM OPERATION OF LAWS t ) 
" All Laws of a General Nature shall have UNIFORM OPERATION . 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS^ 76-6«40*f - THEFT - ELEMENTS t 
" A person commits Theft if he obtains or exercises 
unauthorized* control over the property of another •. 
..." With purpose to deprive him thereof" 
76-6-401(3) U. C. A. - " PURPOSE TO DEPRIVE " means to HAVE THE CONSCIOUS 
QBJECTt 
(a) TO WITHHOLD PROPERTY PERMANENTLY! 
( IN PART PERTINENT ) 
76-6-412 U. c. A. CLASSIFICATION OF OFFENSESi 
(l)THEFT OF PROPERTY AND SERVICES AS PROVIDED IN 
THIS CHAPTER SHALL BE PUNISHABLE AS FOLLOWSi 
(a) As a FELONY OF THE SECOND DEGREE IFi 
(i) The Value of The property or services 
EXCEEDS $ 1.000. 
(b) As A Felony of The THIRD EDGREE IPt 
(i) The value of the property or services 
is MORE THAN $250 But NOT MORE THAN $1.C 
** A STATEMENT OF THE CASE ** 
The Petitioner was INITIALLY CHARGED with " THEST " A "THIRD DEGREE FELONY "' 
And was given a Preliminary Examination on such charge and was "HELD TO ANSWER M at 
Trial in The Second Judicial District Court, County of Weber, State of Utah. 
However, PRIOR TO TRIAL on the said " THIRD DEGREE FELONY THEFT ", The PROSECUTION 
" AMENDED THE INFORMATION " to CHARGE a GREATER DEGREE OF THEFT ( i. e. "THEFT. A FELONY 
OF THE SECOND DEGREE ") but relative to such AMENDED - INCREASED CHARGE; The Petitioner 
was NOT ACCORDED A " PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION" ( ART. I. SEC. 13. CONST. OF UTAH ) Nor 
did The Petitioner " WAIVE" such EXAMINATION " With the consent of The State "i 
FURTHER, in addition to Placing The Petitioner on trial FOR A SECOND DEGREE THEFT 
pursuant to which NO PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION WAS HAD NOR WAIVED, The Trial Court 
failed to Give The * ELEMENTS " INSTRUCTION That This Court Spelled out in STATE V. 
LAINE. 618 P.2d 33 ( UTAH 1980) ( ANOTHER " THEFT " CASB.).... 
Because Appellate Counsel, NEGLECTED TO RAISE THE PLAIN ERROR of NOT ACCORDING A 
". PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION " on The Said " THEFT , SECOND DFTTRKF, FELONY " Nor obtaining 
AWAIVER THEREOF, AND ALSO NOT RAISING THE REVERSIBLE ERROR OF NOT GIVING THE 
LAIKB ... " ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION M, The Petitioner filed A PRO SB HABEAS. PETITION 
( ONLY AFTER APPELLATE COUNSEL WOULD NOT RESPOND TO THE INQUIRIES OF BOTH THE PETITIONER 
AND THE PETITIONER'S MOTHER RELATIVE TO WHETHER APPELLATE COUNSEL INTENDED TO RAISE THE 
FORESTATED CRUCIAL QUESTIONS ) ...Then And only Then was The Petitioner COMPELLED TO 
SEEK TO HAVE HIS HABEAS CONSOLIDATED WITH THE DIRECT APPEAL AND WAS GRANTED IN THE CASE 
OF i STATE V. FAIR. 23 Utah (2d) 456 ( Utah I969) But The Utah Court of Appeals declined 
to Allow CONSOLIDATION OF THE HABEAS AND DIRECT APPEAL ( despite The DUAL REPRESENTATION 
THAT IS EXPRESSLY GUARANTEED UNDER ARTICLE I. SECTION 12. CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ).And as 
A DIRECT consequence thereof, The instant PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI was the ONLY 
KNOWN «BCESSARY COURSE OF ACTION- to which the Petitioner could resort for relief . 
** A STATEMENT OF FACTS ** 
L± JURISDICTION ..<, It is respectfully submitted that consistent with This 
Court»s RULING in STATE V. MORREY. 23 UTAH 273, 64 P. 764 That " THE 
QUESTION OF TRIAL COURT'S LACK OF JURISDICTION MAY BE RAISED FOR THE 
FIRST TIME ON APPEAL M. The instant PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS 
PROPERLY BEFORE THE CAPTIONED COURT. 
II. CONSISTENT WITH THE FACT THAT THE TRIAL COURT IN THE INSTANT CASE, LIKE 
THE TRIAL COURT IN THE LAINR CASE. FAILED TO GIVE AN " ELEMENTS " 
INSTRUCTION, THE PETITIONER, LIKE THE DEFENDANT IN STATE V. LAINB. 618 
P.2d 33 ( UTAH 1980) SHOULD LIKEWISE BE ACCORDED A NEW TRIAL...CONSISTENT 
WITH THE GUARANTEE OF " EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS " UNDER THE 14th. 
AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AND ARTICLE I. SECTION 24. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH'S GUARANTEE OF " A UNIFORM OPERATION OF THE LAWS ". 
This Court in STATE V. LAINB. Supra., REVERSED THE " THEFT " ( OF AN 
AUTOMOBILE ) AND REMANDED THE CASE FOR M A NEW TRIAL " because The Trial Court FAILED 
TO GIVE THE FOLLOWING " ELEMENTS INSTRUCTION "1 
THE CONSCIOUS OBJECTIVE TO WITHHOLD THE 
PROPERTY PERMANENTLY • " 
The preceding LAINE ... M ELEMENTS " INSTRUCTION is verified by The Petitioner's 
APPENDIX - A ( The complete Text of the STATE V. LAINE. Supra., Decision ) 
No different result should be reached in the instant case in light of The WEIGHT 
OF AUTHORITY That Subscribes to the proposition thati 
" THE RIGHT OF CITIZENS TO BE TREATED EQUALLY BY 
LAW IS A WELL-SETTLED PRINCIPLE OF JURISPRUDENCE." 
SEE*. McGOWAN v. STATE OF MARYLAND. 366 0,3.420(1961, 
MCLAUGHLIN V. STATE OF FLORIDA. 379 u.s. 184 
(1964) 
w
 A STATE MUST TREATS ALL SIMILARLY SITUATED PERSONS 
ALIKE M 
SEEt PLYLER V. DOE. 457 U. S. 202 ( 1985 
And under ARTICLE I. SECTION 24. CONSTITUTION OF UTAHi 
" ALL LAWS OF A GENERAL NATURE, SHALL HAVE A UNIFORM 
OPERATION . " 
For The foregoing reasons CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THE. IHSTANT CASE. . 
III. THE FAILURE TO ACCORD A " PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION '* AS GUARANTEED AT 
ARTICLE I. SECTION 13. CONSTITUTION OF UTAH. OR TO OBTAIN A " WAIVER 
THEREOF WITH THE CONSENT OF THE STATE? " SHOULD BE DECLARED FATAL TO 
THE VALIDITY OF THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF THE OFFENSE OF " THEFT" 
A SECOND DEGREE FELONY ". 
This Court has repeatedly and consistent declared thati 
" IT IS ELEMENTARY IN THIS STATE THAT A PERSON 
CANNOT BE TRIED AND CONVICTED WITHOUT A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING OR A WAIVER THEREOF. " 
STATE V. PAY. 45 UTAH 411, 146 P. 300 
STATE V. SHEFFIELD. 45 UTAH 426> 146 P. 306 
STATE V. NELSON, 52 UTAH 617, 176 P. 860 
STATE V. LEEK. 85 UTAH 531, 39 P. 2d 1091 
STATE V. JOHNSON. 100 UTAH 316, 114 P. 2d 1034 
STATE V. JENSEN, 103 UTAH 478, 136 P. 2d 949 
FURTHER, This Court has declared thati 
NO MATTER HOW REPREHENSIBLE THE CONDUCT OF THE 
ACCUSED AMY BE, YET NO PUNISHMENT MAY BE 
INFLICTED WITHOUT A LAW AUTHORIZING IT AND SUCH 
LAW MUST CSEARLY COVER THE C A W 
cf. OGDEN CITY V. McLAUGHLIN. 5 UTAH 387 
SEE ALSOI 
STATE V. HICKEN. 659 P.2 1038 ( UTAH 1983) 
STATE V. HILL. 688 P,2d 1*50 ( UTAH 1984 
STATE g. SCOTT. 732 P.2d 117 ( UTAH 1987) 
And applied to the instant case, THE ONLY LAW THAT CLEARLY COVERED THE " THPT " in 
the instant case, is The LAW PURSUANT TO WHICH A constitutionally guaranteed " PRELIMINARY 
EXAMINATIN " ( Per ART. I, SEC. 13, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH ) is shown by the RECORD to 
have been accorded in the instant case, and THAT LAW is the Law governing " A THEFT ", 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY M And without HAVING BEEN ACCORDED " A PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION " or 
A " WAIVER THEREOF " having been made a matter of RECORD, THE PETITIONER'S CONVICTION 
OF THE " SECOND DEGREE THEFT " WITHOUT A PRELIMINARY CANNOT BE ALLOWED TO STAND when 
viewed in light of This Court's fores^ated RULIH33 ,,-,^ -in t 
STATE V. PAY. SUPRA., 
STATE V. SHEFFIELD. Supra., 
STATE V. NELSON. Supra., 
STATE V. LEEK. Supra., 
STATE V. JOHNSON. Supra., 
STATE V. JENSEN. Supra., 
And in conjunction with This Court's ruling, that when, as in the instant case, The Trial 
Court has rendered its JUDGEMENT AS TO THE SAID M SECOND DEGREE FELONY THEFT " without its 
JURISDICTION HAVING BEEN PROPERLY INVOKED RELATIVE TO SUCH "SECOND DEGREE FELONY THEFT " 
since NO PRELIMINARY HEARING WAS ACCORDED NOR WAIVED ON SUCH DEGREE OF " THEFT " and it 
follows under STATE V. TELFORD. 72 P2d 626 That Such Judgement on " THEFT- A SECOND 
EBGREE FELONY " ... " MUST BE DECLARED A NULLITY. " . SEE ALSO. UNITED STATES v. 
SIVIGLIA, 686 F.2d 832 ( 10th. Cir, 1981) Wherein She Court declared that " SUBJECT-MATTER 
JURISDICTION CANNOSt BE WAIVED NOR CONFERRED UPON THE COURTS BY CONSENT OR STIPULATION OF 
I-HE PARTIES" SEE ALSOl CALIFORNIA v. LaRUB. 409 U. S. 109 ( 1973 ) 
. „. .„- - .JJLJ.J..LW«M o v^ owvjLU-iiOW i>E ALLOWED TO STAND IN LIGHT OF THE FACT 
THAT NO EVIDENCE OF VALUE EXCEEDING $1.000 WAS ADDUCED AT TRIAL TO JUSTIFY THE 
PETITIONER'S CONVICTION OF " SECOND DEGREE FELONY THEFT" ( 76-6-414- fl//a.//l/U. C. A. ) 
ACCORQi THOMPSON v. CITY OF LOUISVILLE. 362 U. S. 199 (i960) 
GARNER v. STATE OF LOUISIANA . 368 U. S. 157 ( I962) 
JOHNSON v. FLORIDA.. 391 U. S. 596 ( J068 
JACKS0N_V. VIRGINIA . 443 U. S. 307 ( 1979) 
FINALLY, Inasmuch as " FAIR PLAY M has been declared to be " AT THE HEART OF DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW " ( GALVIN V,. PRESS. 347 U. S. 522,/1951M BOLLING V. SHARPE, 347 U. SV+99 
( 195*0 
AND "UNDER OUR SYSTEM OF BBSDCKAGXr, WE HAVE ENDEAVORED TO PREVENT EVEN THE PROBABILITY 
OF UNFAIRNESS M ( Declared The LATE MR. JUSTICE BLACK - in IN RE MURCHISON. 349 0. S. 133 
( 1955) When viewed in conjunction with the Guarantee of " DUE PROCESS " under ARTICLE , 
SECTION 7, CONSTITUTION OF UTAH AND THIS COURT DIRECTIVE THAT I 
M
 PROSECUTORS HAVE A DUTY ABOVE PROSECUTIONS 
AND CONVICTIONS AND THAT IS TO SEE THAT JUSTICE 
IS DONE . " 
cf. QQRJIANKAv. MORRIS.594 P.2d 874 ( UTAH 1979) 
The WRIT OF CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED IN THE INSTANT CASE CONSISTENT WITH 
" EVEN-HANDED JUSTICE " ( ACCORD: 1 FRANCIS V. RESWEBER. 329 U. S. 459 A9^7/) 
9. For The forestated reasons, THE WRIT OF CERTIORARI should be GRANTED. 
10. THE APPENDIX contains 1 (The Total Text of STATE V. LAINE. 618 P2d 33 (Utah I98O) 
(b) The Judgement sought to be reviewed. 
Favorable consideration is prayed for. 
Dated this 6th. Day of June, 1992 
Respectfully Submitted, 
CEASAR SWAIN, Petitioner 
** CERTIFICATE U* BAILING ** 
I, Ceasar Swain, do hereby certify that an EXACT COPY of the foregoing PETITION 
was placed in The United States mail, Postage Pre-Paid and addressed toi 
R. PAUL VAN LAM 
Attorney General, State of Utah 
236 State Capitol Bldg., 
Salt Lake City, Utah &Hlk 
3EASAR SWAIN, Petition* 
APft 151992 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
 m 
^Wary T. Noonan 
00O00 C*^* o f ^ Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Ceasar Swain, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Gary Deland, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910738-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 1 5 , 1992) 
Second District, Weber County 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor 
Attorneys: Ceasar Swain, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
R. Paul Van Dam and David F. Bryant, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Billings, and Greenwood (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This matter is before the 
court on its own motion for summary disposition on the basis that 
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review. Both 
parties have filed memoranda in response to the court's motion. 
In addition, appellant has filed a motion for summary 
disposition. We summarily affirm. Utah R. App. P. 10(e). 
Appellant was convicted of second degree felony theft on 
December 14, 1990. He appealed his conviction and the appeal is 
presently pending in this court in Case No. 910068-CA. In that 
appeal, appellant asserts, among other things, that the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury. 
On November 8, 1991, appellant filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. The court dismissed the petition on the basis 
that the action was duplicative of the appeal pending before this 
court. 
The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred in 
dismissing the petition. In reviewing an appeal from a dismissal 
of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we accord the trial 
court's conclusions of law no deference and review them for 
correctness. Fernandez v. Cook, 783 P.2d 547, 549 (Utah 1989). 
perform the function of regular appellate review. Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Utah 1983). "And in the ordinary 
course, a party may not raise issues in a habeas petition that 
could or should have been raised on direct appeal." Fernandez, 
783 P.2d at 549. 
Appellant's petition asserted that the trial court erred in 
failing to hold a preliminary hearing on the amended charge of 
theft and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. 
Although the first issue does not appear to be raised in the 
brief in Case No. 910068-CA, the issue could or should have been 
raised in the direct appeal. The second issue is identical to an 
issue raised in Case No. 910068-CA. Because habeas corpus cannot 
substitute for regular appellate review and appellant could or 
should have raised the issues in his direct appeal, we find no 
error in the trial court's dismissal of the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
GregorYx^. 0TW?7 Judge 
Judittj^M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
REMITTITUR 
Ceasar Swain, ) 
Petitioner and Appellant, ) Case No- 910738-CA 
v. ) 
Gary DeLand, ) Second District, Weber 
) County #910902980 
Respondent and Appellee. ) 
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, the 
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, and the 
MEMORANDUM DECISION having been issued, the matter is hereby 
remitted. 
This 26th day of May, 1992. 
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Geoffrey J. Butler 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Supreme Court 
332 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Swain v. DeLand 
Court of Appeals Case No. 910738-CA 
Dear Mr. Butler: 
Respondent, Gary DeLand, hereby waives the right to file 
a brief in opposition to petition for writ of certiorari in the 
above-captioned matter pursuant to Rule 50(d), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. This waiver does not constitute a stipulation 
that the petition should be granted, but rather, it is Respondent's 
position that the petition should be denied based upon the legal 
analysis contained in Respondent's memorandum in support of summary 
disposition and the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals which are 
attached to this letter. In the event the Court deems as 
additional response by Respondent necessary to its determination, 
a brief in opposition will be provided. 
Very truly yours, 
/ 
DAVID F.^BRYANT 
Assistant Attornei General 
cc: Ceasar Swain 
Enclosures 
FILE COPY 
PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
6100 South 300 East, Suite 204 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801)-265-5638 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
CEASAR SWAIN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
V • 
GARY DELAND, 
Respondent/Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION 
FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION 
Case No. 910738-CA 
Appellee, by and through David F. Bryant, Assistant Attorney 
General, hereby submits the following MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION as requested by 
this Court. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
I. APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS HE HAS A 
DIRECT APPEAL PENDING BEFORE THIS COURT AND 
BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED IN HIS HABEAS PETITION 
COULD OF AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED IN HIS DIRECT 
APPEAL NOW PENDING 
CONCLUSION 
2 
4 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
Appellant is currently incarcerated in the Utah State 
Prison, Draper Facility after being convicted of second degree 
felony theft on December 14, 1990. Appellant took a direct 
appeal from this verdict on February 8, 1991. State v. Swain, 
910068-CA (1991). The issues raised in appellant's direct appeal 
of his conviction which is still pending before this Court are 
(1) whether the lower court erred in denying mistrial motion 
after one of the juror made an improper contact with a witness, 
and (2) whether the lower court erred in denying motion for new 
trial in light of jury instructions and the inconsistent verdicts 
of the jury. 
On November 8, 1991 appellant also filed a petition for writ 
of habeas corpus and memorandum in support thereof, in the Second 
District Court of Davis County. In a memorandum decision entered 
on November 21, 1991, Judge Stanton Taylor dismissed the 
Appellant's petition because the action was "unnecessarily 
duplicative" as an appeal was pending before this Court. On 
December 23, 1991, appellant filed a notice of appeal in this 
case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS HE 
HAS A DIRECT APPEAL PENDING BEFORE THIS COURT 
AND BECAUSE THE ISSUES RAISED IN HIS HABEAS 
PETITION COULD OF AND SHOULD HAVE BEEN RAISED 
IN HIS DIRECT APPEAL NOW PENDING. 
This Court should summarily dismiss appellant's appeal 
because he currently has a direct appeal pending before this 
court from his conviction on December 14, 1990. (See, State v. 
Swain, Case No. 910068-CA, 1991). Generally, those challenging 
2 
the validity of their verdict can make use of a direct criminal 
appeal. A petition for writ of habeas corpus was not intended to 
substitute or duplicate the normal appellate process and should 
only issue under "unusual circumstances". Brown v. Turner, 440 
P.2d 968 (Utah 1968); Codianna v. Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 
1983); Andrews v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980); Rammel v. 
Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1979). The Utah Supreme Court has 
repeatedly dismissed petitions for habeas corpus because they 
were filed before the normal channels of direct appellate review 
have been exhausted or for the lack of an extraordinary occurance 
which would justify the writ. 
In the present case, appellant has not exhausted his right 
to direct appeal of his verdict. Further, the appellant has not 
presented any extraordinary occurance during his underlying 
criminal conviction which would justify allowing a premature 
writ. 
Additionally, this court should summarily dismiss 
appellant's appeal because the issues raised in it could of and 
should have been raised in his direct appeal which is currently 
pending. The Utah Supreme Court in Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d at 
968 stated: 
If the contention of error is something which is known 
or should have been known to the party at the time the 
judgment was entered, it must be reviewed in the manner 
and within the time permitted by regular prescribed 
procedure, or the judgment becomes final and is not 
subject to further attack, except in some unusual 
circumstance . . . . [W]ere it otherwise, the regular 
3 
rules of procedure governing appeals and the 
limitations of time specified therein would be rendered 
impotent. 
Id, 440 P.2d at 969. 
As stated before, appellant is currently appealing his 
conviction via direct appeal before this court. Nothing in 
appellant's habeas petition presents issues that were either not 
known at trial or at least should have been known. The proper 
place for appellant to raise these issues is in his direct 
appeal. Also, appellant has not presented any "unusual 
circumstance" that would mandate review of his conviction. 
Appellant continues to waste the court's time and resources 
in bringing this appeal which was properly dismissed as being 
duplicative by the court below. For these reasons, this Court 
should summarily dismiss appellant's appeal from dismissal of his 
petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellee respectfully request that this Court uphold the 
judgment of the court below and summarily dismiss the appellant's 
appeal from the dismissal of his petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. h 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _2L day of March, 1992. 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on this ^ day of March, 1992, I caused to 
be mailed, postage prepaid, an exact copy of Defendant's 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF SUA SPONTE CONSIDERATION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION to the following address: 
CEASAR SWAIN 
Plaintiff 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 840208 
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IN THE UT. 
Ceasar Swain, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
v. 
Gary Deland, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
WJ 151992 
ylJ&MQ/* •-
T. Noonan 
of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No. 910738-CA 
F I L E D 
( A p r i l 1 5 , 1992) 
Second District, Weber County 
The Honorable Stanton M. Taylor 
Attorneys: Ceasar Swain, Draper, Appellant Pro Se 
R. Paul Van Dam and David F. Bryant, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellee 
Before Judges Orme, Billings, and Greenwood (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
Appellant appeals the trial court's dismissal of his 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This matter is before the 
court on its own motion for summary disposition on the basis that 
the appeal presents no substantial issue for review. Both 
parties have filed memoranda in response to the court's motion. 
In addition, appellant has filed a motion for summary 
disposition. We summarily affirm. Utah R. App. P. 10(e). 
Appellant was convicted of second degree felony theft on 
December 14, 1990. He appealed his conviction and the appeal is 
presently pending in this court in Case No. 910068-CA. In that 
appeal, appellant asserts, among other things, that the trial 
court erred in instructing the jury. 
On November 8, 1991, appellant filed a petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. The court dismissed the petition on the basis 
that the action was duplicative of the appeal pending before this 
court. 
The dispositive issue is whether the trial court erred in 
dismissing the petition. In reviewing an appeal from a dismissal 
of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, we accord the trial 
court's conclusions of law no deference and review them for 
correctness. Fernanda v n~~i-
4b. w 
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perform the function of regular jjroellate review. Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101, 1105 (Uta>/1983). "And in the ordinary 
course, a party may not^raisa-^ssues in a habeas petition that 
could or should have been raised on direct appeal." Fernandez, 
783 P.2d at 549. 
Appellant's petition asserted that the trial court erred in 
failing to hold a preliminary hearing on the amended charge of 
theft and that the trial court erred in instructing the jury. 
Although the first issue does not appear to be raised in the 
brief in Case No. 910068-CA, the issue could or should have been 
raised in the direct appeal. The second issue is identical to an 
issue raised in Case No. 910068-CA. Because habeas corpus cannot 
substitute for regular appellate review and appellant could or 
should have raised the issues in his direct appeal, we find no 
error in the trial court's dismissal of the petition for a writ 
of habeas corpus. 
Gregorys^ Otnr&7 JQdge 
Judit£-M. Billings, Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
